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Note 
Rethinking Off-Label Regulation in the Wake of 
Sorrell v. IMS Health: Can State Involvement 
Compensate for Waning FDA Authority to Curb 
Commercial Free Speech? 
Ashley A. Zborowsky* 
Off-label promotion and the U.S. Food and Drug Admin-
istration’s (FDA, the Agency) current restrictions on commer-
cial “free speech” have garnered much attention in recent years 
due to a district court ruling in United States v. Caronia1 and a 
subsequent Supreme Court decision in Sorrell v. IMS Health.2 
United States v. Caronia is currently pending review in the Se-
cond Circuit following Sorrell—a highly anticipated ruling. The 
outcome of the Caronia case could have a staggering effect on 
FDA regulatory authority with respect to promotional activity, 
and has been the topic of much scholarly debate. However, 
First Amendment rights and commercial free speech are not 
novel issues in the context of pharmaceutical and device law. 
While many entities have challenged the constitutionality of 
FDA’s ban on off-label promotion, in and out of the courtroom, 
deference to Agency interpretations of relevant provisions of 
the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) has enabled FDA to 
recover billions of dollars in penalties from manufacturers for 
off-label promotional activities.3 
Off-label promotion is, essentially, the act of marketing or 
promoting regulated products for uses other than those ap-
                                                          
© 2012 Ashley A. Zborowsky 
       *    Law Student at the University of Minnesota Law School. The author 
would like to thank Professor Ralph Hall, Brandon McDonough, and Terri 
Zborowsky for their thoughtful editing and feedback. 
 1. United States v. Caronia, 576 F. Supp. 2d 385 (E.D.N.Y. 2008). 
 2. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc.,131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011). 
 3. George S. Craft, Jr., Promoting Off-Label in Pursuit of Profit: An Ex-
amination of a Fraudulent Business Model, 8 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 103, 
108–120 (2007) (discussing the scope of both civil and criminal penalties in re-
cent off-label and false claims enforcement). 
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proved by the FDA.4 Because the Court in Sorrell clearly estab-
lishes that pharmaceutical marketing is a form of protected 
speech,5 the FDA must consider other regulatory pathways to 
ensure the safety and efficacy of regulated products. The impli-
cations of the Sorrell decision will not be fully understood until 
it is applied by lower courts, and a thorough analysis of its 
holding is outside the scope of this Note. Still, legal scholars 
and industry actors have posited that, in the wake of Sorrell, 
FDA authority to regulate off-label promotion may be waning.6 
However, the Agency’s off-label ban is rooted in its longstand-
ing mission to safeguard public health—for this reason, there 
remains a strong governmental interest in this issue that 
should be addressed. 
This Note explores the regulatory landscape relative to off-
label promotion and proposes alternatives to current FDA prac-
tices. Part I provides an overview of these practices and dis-
cusses physician autonomy to prescribe off-label. Part II dis-
cusses why other proposed alternatives to curtail off-label use—
such as reimbursement—are insufficient to address the prob-
lem. Finally, Part III contemplates how state attempts at regu-
lating the practice of medicine may provide a viable alternative 
to current regulatory uncertainties under the FDA. This Note 
concludes that state-level involvement, namely, by regulating 
off-label prescribing, may be the most effective way to ensure 
regulated products are used only for their approved indications. 
                                                          
 4. See, e.g., Randall Stafford, Regulating Off-Label Drug Use—
Rethinking the Role of the FDA, 358 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1427, 1428 (2008). 
Manufacturing entities seeking regulatory approval must submit clinical data 
demonstrating the safety and effectiveness of a given product for a particular 
use. See id. at 1427. The product itself does not gain regulatory approval over-
all; rather, it receives approval for a specific indication or use—the treatment 
of hypertension for example. See id. Any use of the product outside of the ap-
proved indication(s) borne on the product label can be considered “off-label.” 
See id. 
 5. Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2659 (“Speech in aid of pharmaceutical market-
ing . . . is a form of expression protected by the Free Speech Clause of the First 
Amendment.”). 
 6. See, e.g., Analysis of US Supreme Court’s Holding that a Ban on Sales 
of Prescription Drug Information Violates the First Amendment, BAKER BOTTS 
(June 30, 2011), http://www.bakerbotts.com/file_upload/2011JunLifeSciences 
SorrellVsIMSPage2.htm (addressing the issue of First Amendment rights in 
the context of Caronia and Sorrell). 
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I. OVERVIEW OF OFF-LABEL PROMOTION, REGULATION, 
AND PENALTIES 
A. FDA REGULATION OF OFF-LABEL PROMOTION 
The FDCA does not directly prohibit off-label promotion. 
Rather, two related statutory provisions indirectly provide au-
thority for this ban. Section 355(a) of the FDCA prevents man-
ufacturers from introducing a new product into interstate 
commerce that has not yet secured FDA approval.7 Marketing a 
drug or device for any use other than that for which it has been 
approved (including no use at all) violates this provision.8 Fur-
ther, section 352(a) prohibits manufacturers from introducing 
into interstate commerce any “misbranded” drug or device.9 A 
product is considered misbranded if its label contains any false 
or misleading information or lacks sufficient information to 
support safe use.10 Advertising and promotional materials can 
be considered part of a product’s label if distributed by the 
manufacturer for purposes of explaining its use.11 The promo-
tional material need not physically accompany the sale of the 
product and may also take the form of verbal representations.12 
However, once a product has gained FDA approval, it can 
be prescribed to treat any illness or disease state regardless of 
its approved indication(s).13  Approximately twenty-one percent 
                                                          
 7. Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (2006). 
 8. See id.; see also Krista Hessler Carver, A Global View of the First 
Amendment Constraints on FDA, 63 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 151, 167 (2008) (“Ac-
cording to the FDA, manufacturer promotion for an off-label use constitutes 
misbranding (because the product is not labeled for the promoted intended 
use).”). 
 9. 21 U.S.C. § 352 (2006). Introducing an adulterated or misbranded 
drug into interstate commerce is considered a “prohibited act” under the stat-
ute. See 21 U.S.C. § 331(a) (2006). 
 10. 21 U.S.C. § 352(a) & (f) (2006); see also Carver, supra note 8, at 156–
57. 
 11. See Carver, supra note 8, at 163–165; see also Michelle M. Mello et al., 
Shifting Terrain in the Regulation of Off-Label Promotion of Pharmaceuticals, 
360 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1557, 1558 (2009) (“Printed and visual materials are 
considered part of a drug’s labeling if they are distributed by the manufacturer 
for the purpose of explaining the uses of the drug, even if they are not pack-
aged with the drug.”). 
 12. Mello, supra note 11. 
 13. James M. Beck & Elizabeth D. Azari, FDA, Off-Label Use, and In-
formed Consent: Debunking Myths and Misconceptions, 53 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 
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of all prescriptions are prescribed for off-label uses.14 Off-label 
use, in many instances, generates the most sales for a given 
product.15 This is often the case in the field of pediatric medi-
cine, where an estimated sixty-two percent of all outpatient 
prescriptions are used off-label for children.16 Therefore, the 
impetus for off-label promotion is derived from the discretion of 
physicians to act autonomously in caring for their patients.17 
Off-label prescribing raises concerns from a regulatory perspec-
tive, where FDA has been administratively charged with safe-
guarding public health and welfare.18 
The governmental interest in a uniform approval process 
for new drug and device indications is quite compelling. A new 
product must be demonstrated as “safe and effective” with the 
support of clinical evidence before it can be introduced into the 
U.S. market. The ban on off-label promotion is intended to cur-
tail widespread use of products that have not yet met this bur-
den for a particular indication, and may or may not pose a risk 
to public health. For this reason, the off-label ban seeks to in-
centivize clinical research to ensure optimal safety. However, 
the length and expense associated with FDA’s current process 
can effectively deter companies from seeking approval for addi-
tional efficacy indications.19 This is particularly true when off-
label use of a product becomes common medical practice.20 
Where clinical trials to demonstrate safety and effectiveness 
                                                          
71, 76–77 (1998). Note that only manufacturers can promote for an off-label 
use, and are subject to federal regulation of marketing activities. Physicians, 
however, can prescribe for the same off-label use without consequence due to 
state regulation of the practice of medicine. 
 14. Shopper Guide to Prescription Drugs: “Off-Label” Drug Use, 
CONSUMERREPORTS.ORG, 4–5  (2007) [hereinafter CONSUMERREPORTS], avail-
able at http://www.consumerreports.org/health/resources/pdf/best-buy-
drugs/money-saving-guides/english/Off-Label-FINAL.pdf (last visited Oct. 23, 
2011). 
 15. See id. 
 16. Alicia T.F. Bazzano et al., Off-Label Prescribing to Children in the 
United States Outpatient Setting, 9 ACAD. PEDIATRICS 81, 84 (2009). 
 17. Beck, supra note 13, at 72. 
 18. What We Do, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/aboutfda 
/whatwedo/default.htm (last visited Oct. 25, 2011). 
 19. See Stafford, supra note 4, at 1428 (arguing that off-label use may en-
courage manufacturers to “game the system”); see also Craft, supra note 3, at 
103–31 (2007) (stating generally that off-label promotion is often the result of 
a calculated and fraudulent business plan). 
 20. See Stafford, supra note 4, at 1427. 
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would typically delay market entry, manufacturers of such 
products have little incentive to pursue regulatory approval 
once off-label use is pervasive and actively generating sales.21 
As one scholar notes: 
[T]he popularity of off-label uses has only increased in recent decades, 
perhaps due in part to the rigorous and expensive nature of the ap-
proval process. The new drug approval process may cost hundreds of 
millions of dollars. A discovery of a new use may occur after the drug 
has exceeded or is near the end of its normal patent protection; thus, 
the economic incentives for manufacturers to seek approval for new 
drug uses when a drug has gone off-patent is significantly reduced.22 
FDA has attempted to crack down on off-label activity in 
recent years for this reason, imposing billion dollar penalties on 
corporations that continue to engage in these practices.23 Most 
notably, in 2009 Pfizer, Inc. paid an astounding $2.3 billion—
the largest criminal fine in U.S. history—for the off-label pro-
motion of Bextra, a drug approved for the treatment of arthritis 
and severe menstrual pain.24 The magnitude of this fine was 
only eclipsed by the $16.8 billion in revenue generated by the 
sale of Bextra from 2001–2008.25 Pfizer had previously been 
charged with misbranding in 2002 for its off-label promotion of 
the drug Neurontin.26 Less than a decade later, the record-
breaking penalties for Pfizer’s recidivism signaled a trend to-
wards heightened regulatory scrutiny of corporate marketing 
practices.27 
Despite increases in penalties and criminal sanctions, 
many manufacturers seem to view fines as a cost of doing busi-
ness and continue to engage in off-label promotion simply be-
cause of the revenue it can generate.28 Arguably, current FDA 
                                                          
 21. CONSUMER REPORTS, supra note 14, at 1. 
 22. Briana R. Barron, Silent Warning: The FDA’s Ban on Off-label Speech: 
Is It Protecting Our Safety? 94 MARQ. L. REV. 983, 989 (2011). 
 23. See, e.g., Craft, supra note 3, at 105–06. 
 24. David Evans, Pfizer Broke the Law by Promoting Drugs for Unap-
proved Uses, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 9, 2009), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/ 
news?pid=newsarchive&sid=a4yV1nYxCGoA. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Mark P. Walters, Medical Device Advertising to Receive Greater FDA 
Scrutiny, FROMMER LAWRENCE & HAUG  (Sept. 29, 2010), available at 
http://www.fdalawyersblog.com/2010/09/medical-device-advertising-to.html 
(“[E]xpanded CDRH staff will increase focus on advertising and promotion of 
medical devices, specifically targeting ‘off-label’ claims made by medical prac-
titioners.”). 
 28. Melly Alazraki, For Big Pharma, Is Breaking the Law the Price of Do-
ing Business?, DAILYFINANCE (Feb. 1, 2010), http://www.dailyfinance.com/sto 
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practices are insufficient to curb such lucrative activities.29 
Constitutional challenges to off-label regulation only frustrate 
the existing regulatory scheme. Thus, where Sorrell and subse-
quent cases can be interpreted to authorize such contentious 
practices on First Amendment grounds, it becomes imperative 
that additional regulatory alternatives be explored.30 
B. OFF-LABEL PROMOTION AS A FORM OF PROTECTED SPEECH 
1. The Central Hudson Test 
First Amendment challenges to FDA’s ban on off-label 
speech prompted courts to apply the four-prong test set forth in 
Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Com-
mission.31 The test requires courts to consider whether (1) the 
speech concerns “lawful activity” that is not misleading, (2) “the 
asserted government interest to be served by the restriction on 
commercial speech is substantial,” then—if both of these condi-
tions have been met—whether (3) “the regulation directly ad-
vances the governmental interest asserted,” and (4) the regula-
tion “is not more extensive than necessary to serve that 
interest.”32 Commercial speech must be “inherently” rather 
than “potentially” misleading.33 
Applying this test, courts have concluded that off-label 
speech concerns lawful activity as it relates to the underlying 
conduct of physicians, who can prescribe off-label at their pro-
fessional discretion—constituting a lawful activity.34 Though 
this element of the first prong is satisfied as it pertains to off-
label promotion, FDA has consistently argued that off-label 
                                                          
ry/company-news/for-big-pharma-is-breaking-the-law-the-price-of-doing-busi 
ness/19340271/. 
 29. See, e.g., Craft, supra note 3, at 122 (claiming that recent settlements 
for off-label conduct indicate these activities are likely to persist). 
 30. See, e.g., Rebecca Dresser & Joel Frader, Off-Label Prescribing: A Call 
for Heightened Professional and Government Oversight, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 
476, 483 (2009) (arguing for further policy reform and congressional action as 
needed “to deter inappropriate off-label prescribing”). 
 31. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 
566 (1980). The test espoused in Central Hudson has become the judicial 
touchstone for evaluating whether government restrictions on commercial 
speech violate the First Amendment generally—this includes off-label market-
ing activities. Id. 
 32. Id. at 557. 
 33. Barron, supra note 22, at 999–1000. 
 34. Id. 
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speech is inherently misleading due to the fact that the Agency 
has not yet evaluated nor approved the basis for such claims.35 
Lower courts, however, have rejected this argument, and truth-
ful, non-misleading speech regarding off-label use has been 
held to satisfy the entire first prong of the Central Hudson 
test.36 
With respect to the second prong of the test, courts have 
had to determine whether the government interest to be served 
is substantial—arguably, this can be read as substantial 
enough to justify the restriction on free speech.37 In the case of 
off-label promotion, there are two related interests at stake—
the first is the integrity of the regulatory process itself, and the 
second, is safeguarding the public health.38 The Supreme Court 
in Thompson v. Western States Medical Center held that 
“[p]reserving the new drug approval process is clearly an im-
portant governmental interest . . . .”39 However, while Western 
States expressly acknowledged this interest as substantial, the 
Court questioned FDA’s assertion that the ban on commercial 
free speech is “‘not more extensive than is necessary to serve 
[those] interest[s].’”40 
To satisfy the third prong of Central Hudson, the govern-
ment must demonstrate that the regulation at issue directly 
advances its interest in a “‘material way.’” 41 In Western States, 
FDA argued that its “premarket approval process, under which 
manufacturers are required to put their proposed drugs 
through tests of safety and effectiveness in order to obtain . . . 
approval to market the drugs, is the best way to guarantee 
drug safety and effectiveness.”42 Applied in the context of off-
label promotion, the ban could be construed to force compliance 
with the established regulatory process so as to achieve the 
Agency’s primary goal.43 However, the Court ultimately held 
                                                          
 35. Id. at 1000. 
 36. Washington Legal Found. v. Friedman, 13 F. Supp. 2d 51 (D.D.C. 
1998); see also Barron, supra note 22, at 1000 (detailing the application of Cen-
tral Hudson to off-label promotion and commercial speech regulation). 
 37. Carver, supra note 8, at 173. 
 38. Barron, supra note 22, at 1001; see also Carver supra note 8, at 173. 
 39. Thompson v. Western States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 358 (2002). 
 40. Id. at 358–59 (alteration in original) (quoting Cent. Hudson Gas & 
Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980)). 
 41. Friedman, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 71 (quoting Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 
761, 770–71 (1993)). 
 42. Western States, 535 U.S. at 369. 
 43. See Beck, supra note 13, at 84–85 (discussing the patient perceptions 
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that—while the governmental interest in protecting the public 
health is in fact substantial—the statute at issue did not direct-
ly advance this goal.44 
With respect to the third and fourth prongs of the Central 
Hudson test, other courts, however, have found that restriction 
of manufacturers’ promotional activities is “one of the few 
mechanisms available to FDA” to advance its regulatory 
goals.45 Additionally, where the “drugs subject to FDA approval 
are already in interstate commerce . . . the obvious restriction 
on conduct is unavailable.”46 For these reasons, FDA has ar-
gued that there is no less restrictive means of curtailing off-
label conduct than to ban the speech that facilitates or encour-
ages such conduct.47 Yet in Washington Legal Foundation v. 
Friedman, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia 
court held that FDA restrictions were “considerably more ex-
tensive than necessary to further the substantial government 
interest.”48 Similarly in Western States, the Court stated “[t]he 
fact that ‘all of [these alternatives] could advance the Govern-
ment’s asserted interest in a manner less intrusive to . . . First 
Amendment rights’ indicated that the law was ‘more extensive 
than necessary.’”49 
Therefore, it is with the fourth prong of Central Hudson 
that FDA’s ban on commercial speech has failed to pass consti-
tutional muster.50 For example, though a settlement agreement 
was ultimately reached, Allergan, Inc. recently argued in an 
FDA enforcement action that “FDA has not provided exceptions 
permitting communication of truthful medical evidence or oth-
                                                          
of drugs being used off-label as either unapproved or disapproved). 
 44. Western States, 525 U.S. at 375. At issue in this case is § 127(a) of the 
Food and Drug Modernization Act of 1997 (FDAMA) restricting the advertis-
ing or promotion of compounded drugs, as compounds are exempted from 
FDA’s standard drug approval process. Id. at 360. 
 45. Friedman, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 72. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Western States, 525 U.S. at 368–71. 
 48. Friedman, 13 F.Supp.2d at 73. 
 49. Western States, 525 U.S. at 371–72 (alteration in original) (quoting 
Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 491 (1995)). The Court in Western 
States went on to find that the government interest “could be satisfied by the 
far less restrictive alternative of requiring each compounded drug to be labeled 
with a warning that the drug had not undergone FDA testing and that its 
risks were unknown.” Id. at 376. 
 50. Barron, supra note 22, at 1003. 
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erwise accommodating First Amendment concerns.”51 Conceiv-
ably, the suppression of truthful, non-misleading speech re-
garding off-label use of a product is far-reaching in its attempt 
to regulate misuse of such products.52 Despite the fact that the 
Agency has managed to dodge the proverbial bullet when it 
comes to First Amendment challenges, existing case law is gen-
erally unfavorable. As such, FDA’s ban may not be sufficiently 
“narrowly tailored” to survive First Amendment challenges, 
particularly following the Supreme Court’s decision in Sorrell.53 
As noted by the Supreme Court in Western States, not all 
regulation of commercial speech is unconstitutional.54 However, 
the Court had yet to officially recognize speech related to 
pharmaceutical marketing or promotion as entitled to First 
Amendment protection until just last year in Sorrell.55 
2. Recent Developments in First Amendment Jurisprudence: 
Potential Implications of Sorrell v. IMS Health and United 
States v. Caronia 
On June 23, 2011, a six-three majority of the Supreme 
Court struck down a Vermont law that restricted the “sale, dis-
closure, and use of pharmacy records . . . reveal[ing] the pre-
scribing practices of individual doctors.”56 This process of 
pharmaceutical promotion is referred to as “detailing.”57 The 
Vermont Prescription Confidentiality Law of 2007 (Act 80) pro-
hibited such disclosure practices without provider consent, sub-
ject only to the exception that prescriber-identifying infor-
mation could be disseminated and used for specified purposes.58 
By enacting this legislation, Vermont intended to impede man-
                                                          
 51. Memorandum of Law In Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction 
at 12, Allergan v. United States, No. 09-1879 (D.C. Cir. filed Oct.1, 2009) (cap-
italization in original altered). 
 52. Barron, supra note 22, at 1002–03; see also Coleen Klasmeier & Mar-
tin H. Redish, Off-Label Prescription Advertising, the FDA and the First 
Amendment: A Study in the Values of Commercial Speech Protection, 37 AM. 
L.J. & MED. 315, 356 (2011) (“Whether it would be simpler . . . for the govern-
ment to achieve its goal indirectly by suppressing protected speech is irrele-
vant to the constitutional inquiry. The suppression of fully protected, poten-
tially valuable expression is far too high a price to pay for governmental 
convenience.”). 
 53. See ROPES & GRAY, supra note, at 1. 
 54. Western States, 535 U.S. at 367. 
 55. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011). 
 56. Id.at 2659. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 2660. 
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ufacturers’ ability to sway providers towards brand-name drugs 
in lieu of generic equivalents, thereby helping to reduce state 
health care costs.59 
Though the constitutional challenge to Act 80 was unsuc-
cessful in district court, the Second Circuit overturned the rul-
ing, holding that the statute “is a commercial speech restriction 
that does not directly advance the substantial state interests 
asserted by Vermont, and is not narrowly tailored to serve 
those interests, the statute cannot survive intermediate scruti-
ny under Central Hudson.”60 In his majority opinion, Justice 
Kennedy affirmed the decision of the Second Circuit, noting 
that the burden placed on protected expression is not justified 
by the State’s asserted interest in physician confidentiality, 
protecting doctors from “harassing” sales tactics, or protecting 
the integrity of the physician-patient relationship.61 Further, 
the statute did not permissibly advance the State’s goal of re-
ducing health care costs.62 Lastly, the State offered no explana-
tion as to why other available remedies—such as declining to 
meet with “detailers”—would be inadequate.63 Justice Kennedy 
also specifically noted that Vermont does not, in fact, contend 
that the practice of detailing necessarily results in the dissemi-
nation of false or misleading information.64 
The Court in Sorrell expressly stated that “[s]peech in aid 
of pharmaceutical marketing . . . is a form of expression pro-
tected by the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment.”65 
The holding in this case may have a profound effect on FDA’s 
ban of off-label promotion, despite the fact that the case con-
cerns pharmaceutical marketing generally and does not specifi-
cally address FDA regulatory authority or off-label activity.66 
According to legal analysts, the Sorrell decision is “likely to af-
fect future court decisions about FDA’s ability to bar manufac-
turers from providing truthful information to physicians re-
                                                          
 59. Id. at 2661; see also ROPES & GRAY, supra note, at 1 (describing the 
purpose of Act 80). 
 60. IMS Health Inc. v. Sorrell, 630 F.3d 263, 267 (2nd Cir. 2010). 
 61. Sorrell, 131 S.Ct. at 2669–70. 
 62. Id. at 2670–71. 
 63. Id. at 2669. 
 64. Id. at 2672. 
 65. Id. at 2659. 
 66. ROPES & GRAY, supra note, at 2. 
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garding off-label uses of approved pharmaceutical products.”67 
Therefore, where the commercial speech at issue is both truth-
ful and non-misleading, Sorrell may have the effect of halting a 
Central Hudson inquiry as to whether or not the restriction on 
speech is justified—deeming speech in aid of pharmaceutical 
marketing per se protected expression within the ambit of the 
First Amendment.68 
As indicated previously, the full effect of the Court’s hold-
ing in Sorrell will not be understood until it is applied by lower 
courts. Currently pending review in the Second Circuit, U.S. v. 
Caronia may be a pivotal ruling for this reason.69 Unlike Sor-
rell, Caronia specifically deals with the issue of speech vis-à-vis 
off-label promotion. Alfred Caronia, a sales representative for 
Orphan Medical, Inc., pled guilty to felony misbranding related 
to off-label promotion of the drug Xyrem.70 The district court for 
the Eastern District of New York refused to dismiss the crimi-
nal charges against Caronia—upholding FDA’s off-label ban 
under the four-part Central Hudson test—stating that it is 
“unable to identify non-speech restrictions that would likely 
constrain in any effective way manufacturers from circumvent-
ing [the] approval process.”71 
Following this holding, it was thought that Caronia would 
make it more difficult for pharmaceutical and device manufac-
turers to prevail in off-label cases on First Amendment grounds 
alone.72 However, Sorrell quickly followed Caronia; whether or 
not the Second Circuit extends the analysis in Sorrell on review 
                                                          
 67. BAKER BOTTS, supra note 6; see also ROPES & GRAY, supra note, at 3 
(commenting that the Sorrell holding “plants a stake in the ground firmly on 
the side of First Amendment rights”). 
 68. Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2659 (“Speech in aid of pharmaceutical market-
ing . . . is a form of expression protected by the Free Speech Clause of the First 
Amendment.”). 
 69. See Caronia Update: What Went Down at the Oral Argument, DRUG 
AND DEVICE LAW (Jan. 21, 2011, 2:15 PM), http://druganddevicelaw 
.blogspot.com/2011/01/caronia-update-what-went-down-at-oral.html [hereinaf-
ter Caronia Update] (“We’ve blogged about United States v. Caronia before. In 
fact, some might say we’re a bit obsessed by it, and with good reason; the First 
Amendment’s a big deal to us . . . .”). 
 70. United States v. Caronia, 576 F. Supp. 2d 385, 388–89 (E.D.N.Y. 
2008). Xyrem®, also known as sodium oxybate, is a federally-controlled sub-
stance approved for the treatment of narcolepsy. Misuse of the drug can have 
harmful side effects, especially at high doses. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
MEDICATION GUIDE: XYREM 1–2 (Nov. 18, 2005), available at  
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/drugs/drugsafety/ucm089830.pdf. 
 71. Caronia, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 401. 
 72. SIDLEY AUSTIN, supra note 6, at 2. 
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to overturn Caronia’s felony conviction may have broad impli-
cations for future challenges to FDA regulatory authority. Fur-
ther challenges on First Amendment grounds in light of Caro-
nia may erode FDA’s ability to use off-label speech as a proxy 
for conduct. The relationship between misbranding, regulated 
speech, and the conduct FDA seeks to control presents a wide 
range of issues that cannot be adequately addressed under the 
existing regulatory framework.73 This issue, however, is in 
many ways broader than Caronia, and the need to protect the 
public from potentially dangerous off-label use  undoubtedly 
warrants further discussion. 
C. THE SPEECH VERSUS CONDUCT DISTINCTION 
The inherent problem with off-label promotion is that it 
encourages off-label conduct, which is the use of regulated 
products outside of their approved indications. Thus, FDA’s 
regulatory authority to curb off-label speech does not necessari-
ly strike at the heart of the issue it seeks to resolve:74 
A major defect in the FDA’s current restrictive approach to the regu-
lation of off-label promotion is that it reflects the FDA’s decision to 
address conduct as to which it had repeatedly expressed concern by 
regulating speech endorsing that conduct—and doing so at a categori-
cal level—rather than by regulating the underlying conduct itself.75 
This is due, in large part, to statutory constraints on FDA 
authority as well as federalism concerns with respect to indi-
vidual states’ regulation of medical practice with the state.76  
FDA’s restriction on commercial speech is one of the few mech-
anisms available to the Agency to control harmful misuse of 
regulated products.77 
Off-label promotion is problematic—even that which is 
truthful and non-misleading because it arguably encourages 
off-label prescribing of products that have not yet demonstrated 
                                                          
 73. See, e.g., Klasmeier, supra note 52, at 342–43 (arguing that, despite a 
strong public health interest, FDA’s off-label ban is unjustifiable under exist-
ing commercial speech doctrine). 
 74. Id. at 354 (“[W]hile categorically prohibiting promotion of off-label use, 
the government has for the most part not restricted off-label use.”). 
 75. Id. at 335. 
 76. S. REP. NO. 74-361, at 3 (1935) (stating that the FDCA was “not in-
tended as a medical practices act and [did] not interfere with the practice of 
the healing art”). 
 77. Washington Legal Found. v. Friedman, 13 F. Supp. 2d 51, 72 (D.D.C. 
1998). 
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safety and effectiveness as required by FDA.78 Both FDA and 
courts have repeatedly acknowledged, however, that FDA does 
not have the statutory authority to regulate the practice of 
medicine.79 Therefore, though FDA may seek to bar manufac-
turers from facilitating off-label conduct, the conduct itself is 
not unlawful nor within FDA’s regulatory purview. Without the 
ability to regulate physician conduct, “the federal government 
has limited methods to ensure the quality and necessity of off-
label drug use” in its attempts to secure and promote the public 
health.80 
Though FDA strongly enforces the ban on off-label promo-
tion, it is both insufficient and impractical to sustain such a 
categorical standard in this domain. Further, in light of current 
uncertainties posed by Sorrell and Caronia, FDA’s ability to 
use speech as a proxy to regulate undesirable conduct may soon 
be compromised.81 The speech/conduct distinction then becomes 
critical to addressing the regulatory dilemma facing FDA; that 
is, how to balance concerns of safety and efficacy with the com-
peting interests of patient care and physician autonomy.82 This 
Note will argue that future efforts aimed at curtailing off-label 
use should be directed at physician conduct rather than that of 
manufacturers. Conduct-based control mechanisms can be ex-
pected to play a significant role in future off-label regulation, as 
speech-based restrictions are being met with heightened scru-
tiny under the First Amendment. Although this approach will 
necessarily require state-level involvement, FDA may not have 
many other options pending the outcome of Caronia and other 
potential constitutional challenges. 
                                                          
 78. Klasmeier, supra note 52, at 332 (“Given the FDA’s determination, 
often repeated in the context of off-label use, that new uses are by definition 
unsafe and ineffective because they lack FDA approval, the FDA’s position in 
the unapproved new drugs context that not all such drugs are unsafe or inef-
fective is hard to comprehend.”). 
 79. S. REP. NO. 74-361, at 3 (1935); see also Beck, supra note 13, at 76 
(“FDA never has had authority to regulate the practice of medicine . . . .”). 
 80. Amy E. Todd, No Need for More Regulation: Payors and Their Role in 
Balancing the Cost and Safety Considerations of Off-Label Prescriptions, 37 
AM. J.L. & MED. 422, 423 (2011). 
 81. See Caronia Update, supra note 69 (“Caronia represents an opportuni-
ty for a Court of Appeals to pass on the constitutionality of FDA’s draconian 
and convoluted off-label promotion rules.”). 
 82. See Stafford, supra note 4, at 1427 (citing both the pros and cons of off-
label prescribing; namely, that access and treatment based on emerging evi-
dence must be adequately weighted against safety considerations). 
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D. PHYSICIAN AUTONOMY WITH RESPECT TO OFF-LABEL 
PRESCRIBING 
Within the bounds of acceptable medical practice, physi-
cians enjoy broad discretion to prescribe any approved product 
for off-label use.83 FDA has even recognized that off-label pre-
scribing may, in fact, be the standard of care in some instanc-
es.84 The advantages of physician autonomy with respect to off-
label use are fairly straightforward; patients gain earlier access 
to treatments and therapies and physicians are allowed “to 
adopt new practices based on emerging evidence.”85 Much liter-
ature exists regarding the efficacy of off-label uses in treating a 
variety of conditions and disease states—published by physi-
cians and often disseminated by manufacturers in support of 
such use.86 FDA’s ban on off-label speech has been touted as 
obstructing the dissemination of medical literature and emerg-
ing evidence to physicians, arguably inhibiting informed deci-
sion-making.87 
While physicians are of course subject to claims of medical 
malpractice, off-label prescribing is not itself evidence of mal-
practice per se.88 Therefore, the tort system may not provide a 
reliable control mechanism with respect to off-label conduct 
and is by no means an effective substitute for regulatory over-
sight.89 Yet because off-label use may constitute the accepted 
                                                          
 83. See Mello, supra note 11, at 1557 (emphasizing the fact that physi-
cians may freely prescribe drugs for off-label uses despite the fact that drug 
manufacturers may not promote for such uses). 
 84. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: GOOD REPRINT 
PRACTICES FOR THE DISTRIBUTION OF MEDICAL JOURNAL ARTICLES AND 
MEDICAL OR SCIENTIFIC REFERENCE PUBLICATIONS ON UNAPPROVED NEW 
USES OF APPROVED DRUGS AND APPROVED OR CLEARED MEDICAL DEVICES 3 
(Jan. 2009), available at http://www.fda.gov/OHRMS/DOCKETS/98fr/FDA-
2008-D-0053-gdl.pdf (“[O]ff-label uses or treatment regimens may be im-
portant and may even constitute a medically recognized standard of care.”). 
 85. Stafford, supra note 4, at 1427–28 (“[A] key promotional strategy is 
providing physicians with journal articles about off-label uses.”). 
 86. Gregory Conko, Hidden Truth: The Perils and Protections of Off-Label 
Drug and Medical Device Promotion, 21 HEALTH MATRIX 149, 150 (2011) 
(“[Physicians not paid by a drug or device manufacturer] are free to tout to 
benefits of off-label uses in any way to any listener.”). 
 87. Id. at 151. 
 88. Todd, supra note 80, at 424 (citing the fact that an off-label drug use is 
never conclusive to establish malpractice liability, though off-label prescribing 
may be introduced as evidence to substantiate a claim for negligence). 
 89. But see id. at 439 (arguing that tort liability can effectively “fill the 
gaps” where payor or market legislation fails and that the threat of litigation 
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standard of care in some fields—oncology, for example—the re-
verse can also be true for physicians. The American Medical 
Association (AMA) has noted that, in some cases, physicians 
may be guilty of malpractice for failure to adhere to the off-
label standard of care and has lobbied extensively to preserve 
physician autonomy in the interest of patient care.90 
In 2007, the AMA passed Resolution 918 reaffirming its 
position that the off-label use of FDA-approved drugs and de-
vices, when supported by clinical evidence, expert consensus 
opinion, or accepted standards of care, is not only permissible 
but encouraged among physicians.91 The resolution lobbies 
support for “the autonomous clinical decision-making authority 
of a physician” and states that while ongoing research and clin-
ical trials to verify outcomes “should be encouraged and sup-
ported,” the lack of such data should not impede off-label use of 
regulated products. 92 Further, scientific trials should demon-
strate the “clinical benefit” of an off-label use despite the fact 
that such trials may not lead to an approved indication.93 In-
side of the medical community, many seem to agree with this 
position, and argue that regulations should follow—not pre-
cede—science and that government should not impede a physi-
cian’s ability to practice medicine when an off-label use would 
be optimal for patient care.94 
Still, vast physician autonomy may compromise the integ-
rity of a uniform approval process, as cited in the New England 
Journal of Medicine: 
Physicians’ freedom to prescribe drugs off-label carries important ad-
vantages. . . . At the same time, off-label use has potentially negative 
consequences. It undercuts expectations that drug safety and efficacy 
have been fully evaluated. When newer, more expensive drugs are 
used off-label, it increases health care costs. It undermines the incen-
tives for manufacturers to perform rigorous studies—and instead sub-
tly encourages them to game the system by seeking approval for sec-
                                                          
on “failure to warn” claims may be sufficient to keep manufacturers in check). 
 90. Margaret Z. Johns, Informed Consent: Requiring Doctors to Disclose 
Off-Label Prescriptions and Conflicts of Interest, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 967, 968–69 
(2007). 
 91. AM. MED. ASS’N HOUSE OF DELEGATES, RESOLUTION 918: 
PROHIBITION ON THE USE OF FDA-APPROVED DRUGS AND MEDICAL DEVICES 
OFF-LABEL 1 (2007) (on file with author). 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Beck, supra note 13, at 79 (arguing that clinical variation and the 
time delay in regulations results in the government impeding or otherwise 
hindering the practice of medicine). 
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ondary indications for which clinical trials are less complicated and 
less expensive. And off-label use may discourage evidence-based prac-
tice.95 
A 2006 study published in Archives of Internal Medicine 
evaluated 725 million prescriptions and found that twenty-one 
percent of them were off-label; of that twenty-one percent, sev-
enty-three percent were for a use that lacked any “firm scien-
tific evidence.”96 Though slightly dated, this information bol-
sters FDA’s argument in favor of greater regulatory controls. 
Physicians may, in fact, have misconceptions about the FDA 
approval process and the level of evidence supporting a drug’s 
indications.97 
A survey conducted at the University of Chicago Medical 
Center found physicians were more likely to hold the erroneous 
belief that a drug has FDA approval for an indication if they 
themselves had prescribed it for that particular indication.98 
This and related studies demonstrate the potential dangers of 
off-label use and highlight the need for greater oversight of pre-
scribing practices relative to such risks.99 Because regulating 
the practice of medicine is traditionally a space wholly reserved 
for states, state involvement is required to scrutinize off-label 
prescribing practices.100 
II. ANALYSIS 
A. THE CASE FOR STATE INVOLVEMENT: WHY REIMBURSEMENT 
ALONE IS INSUFFICIENT TO CURTAIL OFF-LABEL PRACTICES 
It is widely argued that curbing reimbursement for unap-
proved uses will reduce off-label activity and, in fact, promote 
                                                          
 95. Stafford, supra note 4, at 1427–28. 
 96. David Radley, Stan Finkelstein & Randall Stafford, Off-label Prescrib-
ing Among Office-Based Physicians, 66 ARCHIVES OF INTERNAL MED. 1021, 
1023 (2006). 
 97. Rick Nauert, Off-Label Use May be Off-Track, PSYCH CENTRAL (Aug. 
24, 2009), http://psychcentral.com/news/2009/08/24/off-label-use-may-be-off-
track/7926.html. 
 98. Id.; see also Evans, supra note 24 (“Most physicians don’t keep track of 
FDA-approved uses of drugs . . . .”). 
 99. Todd, supra note 80, at 426 (discussing the risks associated with off-
label use) (“[W]hile off-label prescribing can be very beneficial to some pa-
tients, this common practice can also be unnecessary and, in some cases, very 
risky.”). 
 100. Id. at 429. 
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health care cost containment.101 Third-party payor reimburse-
ment decisions for off-label prescriptions purport to act as a 
proxy for regulatory oversight, dissuading physicians (and their 
patients) from off-label use.102 In light of current regulatory un-
certainties, this alternative seems much more capable of cur-
tailing off-label use than enforcing a ban on promotion—even to 
the tune of $2.3 billion.103 Yet due to the benefits of off-label 
prescribing, many states have actually done the exact oppo-
site—enacting legislation requiring insurers to cover off-label 
prescriptions for certain conditions such as cancer.104 
The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) 
make up the largest payor of health care costs in the country.105 
CMS has made national coverage decisions have been made to 
reimburse those services deemed “reasonable and necessary” 
pursuant to requirements of the Social Security Act.106 The 
“reasonable and necessary” standard is not, however, a corol-
lary to FDA’s “safe and effective” benchmark requirement.107 
As a result, CMS routinely reimburses off-label use of regulated 
products.108 Thus, because CMS coverage decisions heavily in-
fluence the coverage decisions of private third-party payors, 
mandates alone are unlikely to curtail off-label use.109 This is 
true for several reasons, namely: 1) CMS coverage decisions are 
not binding across localities, though national coverage deci-
sions preempt state mandates; 2) self-insured plans are exempt 
from state mandates under the Employee Retirement Income 
                                                          
 101. Id. at 422–23. 
 102. Id. 
 103. See generally Evans, supra note 24 (discussing the recidivism of “Big 
Pharma” with respect to off-label activity despite the possibility of excessive 
fines and penalties being imposed by the government). 
 104. 2006 Prescription Drug Legislation, NAT’L CONF. STATE LEGS. (March 
2009), http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/health/archive-2006-prescription-
drug-state-legislation.aspx. 
 105. MEDPAC, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: MEDICARE PAYMENT POLICY, 
app. B 8 (March 2003), available at:  http://www.medpac.gov/documents 
/mar03_entire_report.pdf. 
 106. Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(a)(1)(A) (2006) (“[N]o payment 
shall be made . . . for any items or services . . . which . . . are not are not rea-
sonable and necessary for the diagnosis or treatment of illness or injury or to 
improve the functioning of a malformed body member.”). 
 107. See id. 
 108. See, e.g., Todd, supra note 80, at 428, 434 (commenting that Medicare 
recently relaxed rules regarding payment for certain types of off-label cancer 
treatments). 
 109. See id. at 434 (“Most private insurers base their reimbursement mod-
els on Medicare’s rules.”). 
015 ZBOROWSKY_PROOF -SK.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 7/5/2012  1:29 PM 
942 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 13:2 
 
 
Security Act (ERISA); and 3) the practice of medicine directly 
influences reimbursement; therefore, regulating the practice of 
medicine itself is sufficient to affect coverage determinations.110 
1. Coverage Decisions Are Not Binding Across Localities 
National Coverage Determinations (NCDs), administered 
by the Agency’s national office, are usually reserved for items 
and services that affect a large number of beneficiaries.111 
NCDs cannot vary by region and all contractors are required to 
comply with such coverage decisions.112 While NCDs are bind-
ing, the majority of coverage decisions are made at the local 
level through regional contractors.113 The country is divided in-
to eleven regions, and each regional contractor issues its own 
Local Coverage Determinations (LCDs)—stipulating covered 
items and services for that jurisdiction.114 If a contractor serves 
multiple jurisdictions, uniform LCDs are encouraged.115 How-
ever, a regional LCD by one contractor does not necessarily af-
fect nor influence the LCD of another.116 Contractors can devel-
op their own LCDs for “reasonable and necessary” services not 
yet addressed by national determinations—making it especially 
difficult to regulate reimbursement for off-label uses.117 
It is not uncommon that five or more LCDs apply to the 
same product or procedure.118 Moreover, national coverage de-
cisions are federally regulated and preempt both regional deci-
sions as well as state mandates either in favor of or against off-
label use.119 Such evidence-based determinations typically in-
fluence the coverage decisions of other payors, despite the fact 
that “reasonable and necessary” does not apply to private par-
ties.120 It follows, then, that constraining off-label coverage at 
                                                          
 110. See id. at 434–38  (“While physicians have the ability to prescribe off-
label as they wish without governmental interference, the prospect of non-
payment will guide how doctors practice medicine.”). 
 111. MEDPAC, supra note 105, at 246. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. at 245. 
 114. Id. at 247. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. See Todd, supra note 80, at 434 (“Most private insurers base their re-
imbursement models on Medicare’s rules.”). 
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the state level would necessarily require multi-state coopera-
tion and CMS involvement. This approach seems unlikely giv-
en the fact that even though both CMS and FDA belong to the 
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and could, 
logically, join forces to impose the off-label ban, neither agency 
has elected to pursue this option. For private payors, ERISA 
preemption renders self-insured plans immune to state cover-
age mandates and further complicates such tactics.121 
2. ERISA Preemption for Self-Insured Plans Compromises 
Efficacy 
With self-insured plans, large employers can administer 
their own benefits as they have enough employees to create a 
solvent risk pool.122 Typically, a self-insured employer will es-
tablish a special trust to pay any incurred claims.123 The em-
ployer assumes liability for all payments, rather than purchas-
ing health coverage at a premium from a third-party carrier.124 
According to a recent study, nearly forty-seven million Ameri-
can employees receive health benefits from some form of self-
insured plan.125 Because the Employee Retirement Income Se-
curity Act (ERISA) regulates such plans—placing them outside 
the realm of state control—the sheer number of insured may be 
sufficient to render coverage mandates both impractical and in-
effective.126 
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ap-
                                                          
 121. See id. at 437–38. 
 122. See U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, ANNUAL REPORT ON SELF-INSURED GROUP 
HEALTH PLANS (2011) at ii–1, available at  http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/ACA 
ReportToCongress032811.pdf; Patricia Butler, ERISA Implications for State 
Health Care Access Initiatives: Impact of the Maryland “Fair Share Act” Court 
Decision, STATE COVERAGE INITIATIVES (Nov. 2006), 
http://www.statecoverage.org/node/170 (follow “ERISA Implications . . .” hy-
perlink) (describing the applicability of ERISA to state health care initiatives 
aimed at employer-based income subsidies). 
 123. Butler, supra note 122. 
 124. Id. 
 125. See id. This report contains general information regarding self-insured 
employee health benefit plans and financial information regarding the spon-
soring employers as required by The Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act of 2010. See also Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 
111–148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010). 
 126. Todd, supra note 80, at 429 (noting that states may act to control off-
label use, though “[t]he Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), a 
federal statute, preempts any state legislation. Consequently, these insurance 
mandate statutes are vulnerable to an ERISA challenge.”) (citation omitted). 
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plies to pensions and other benefits programs, such as health 
insurance, sponsored by private employers.127 Under ERISA, 
states cannot deem employee benefit plans as insurers and are 
prohibited from regulating such plans directly.128 A state law 
will be preempted by ERISA if it: 1) “[r]efers to an ERISA plan, 
either explicitly or by requiring reference to an ERISA plan in 
order to comply with the state law” or 2) “[h]as a connection 
with an ERISA plan by substantially affecting its benefits, ad-
ministration, or structure.”129 Therefore, state mandates ban-
ning coverage for off-label usage would not extend to self-
insured plans—a significant and growing number of the coun-
try’s total insured population—and, for this reason, cannot pro-
vide a viable alternative to the current regulatory scheme nor 
its proposed alternatives.130 The Practice of Medicine Directly 
Influences Reimbursement 
Though ERISA challenges may render a reimbursement 
model impracticable, state regulation of off-label prescribing 
could potentially have the analogous effect of influencing cov-
erage decisions and is not constrained or preempted by any fed-
eral statutes. A payor reimbursement model may, in fact, in-
duce physicians to comport with established standards; 
however, theoretically, the model should work both ways. Just 
as the prospect of nonpayment will guide physician decision-
making, payors also have a strong incentive to decrease costs 
and eliminate unnecessary or investigational usage.131 In es-
tablishing formularies132 or compendia,133 frequency of use and 
acceptable standards of care may impact a payor’s coverage de-
termination.134 For example, if physicians in Ohio are prohibit-
                                                          
 127. Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), Pub. L. No. 93–
406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. (2006)). 
 128. Butler, supra note 122, at 3–4. 
 129. Id. at 5 (citations omitted). 
 130. See Todd, supra note 80, at 438 (stating that limitations to state man-
dates are inherent due to ERISA preemption). 
 131. See id. at 434–35. 
 132. A formulary is a list of drugs that is preferred by a health insurance 
plan. Michael Bihari, Understanding Your Health Plan Drug Formulary, 
ABOUT.COM (Feb. 25, 2010), http://healthinsurance.about.com/od/prescrip 
tiondrugs/a/understanding_formulary.htm. 
 133. In the medical context, a compendium is a guide for drug administra-
tion for the treatment of disease. See NCCN Drugs & Biologics Compendium, 
NAT’L COMPREHENSIVE CANCER NETWORK, http://www.nccn.org/professionals/ 
drug_compendium/content/contents.asp (last visited Mar. 11, 2012). 
 134. See Todd, supra note 80, at 435. 
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ed from prescribing mifepristone off-label, there is no reason for 
carriers serving the region to reimburse for such use.135 Moreo-
ver—though the law was struck down on First Amendment 
grounds—prohibiting pharmaceutical detailing to curb state 
healthcare costs was fundamental to the Vermont statute in 
Sorrell; this bolsters the argument that the practice of medicine 
can directly influence reimbursement.136 
Though some coverage decisions are made on a case-by-
case basis, widespread state law restrictions of physician off-
label prescribing may act to effectively curtail off-label activity 
from a purely economic perspective.137 Some combination of re-
imbursement and other state-based controls—regulating the 
practice of medicine being one such option—may work in tan-
dem to curtail intra-state off-label activity and have the poten-
tial to be adopted by neighboring states if successful. A lack or 
decline in FDA regulatory power need not impart the issues of 
off-label control, safety, and cost containment decisions into the 
hands of private parties.138 
B. CORDRAY V. PLANNED PARENTHOOD: REGULATING OFF-LABEL 
CONDUCT THROUGH THE PRACTICE OF MEDICINE 
A recent case out of Ohio has grappled with the issue of off-
label use in regulating the practice of medicine. Outside of the 
context of abortion policy and reproductive rights, the case may 
be illustrative of the ways in which state-based controls can be 
leveraged to accomplish Agency goals. 
1. Off-label Prohibition in the State of Ohio: Examining 
Cordray 
In 2009, the Ohio Supreme Court upheld a statute prohib-
                                                          
 135. See discussion infra Part II.B. 
 136. See Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653. 
 137. See Todd, supra note 80, at 434–35 (“[T]he prospect of nonpayment 
will guide how doctors practice medicine.”). Perhaps a case study of health 
care trends in states with similar laws (e.g., Ohio) is needed to examine the 
efficacy of such a model. However, it is without a doubt that state involvement 
in this realm is necessary.  See generally Dresser, supra note (concluding that 
some regulation of the medical profession itself will be necessary to tackle the 
problem of off-label use). 
 138. Todd, supra note 80, at 429 (contemplating the best way to address 
the inherent risks in off-label use and arguing that the private market may 
also be capable of regulating off-label activity through other mechanisms, par-
ticularly where state and federal laws are susceptible to preemption or consti-
tutional challenge). 
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iting the use of mifepristone139 (“RU-486”) outside of its ap-
proved indication.140 Local providers, including Planned 
Parenthood, challenged the constitutionality of R.C. 2919.123, 
which required in part that in order to prescribe RU-486 a phy-
sician must satisfy “all the criteria established by federal law . . 
. in accordance with all provisions of federal law that govern 
the use of RU-486 (mifepristone) for inducing abortions.”141 The 
statute defined federal law as “any law, rule, or regulation of 
the United States or any drug approval letter of the food and 
drug administration of the United States that governs or regu-
lates the use of RU-486 (mifepristone) for the purpose of induc-
ing abortion.”142 
Planned Parenthood asserted that “neither the FDA’s ap-
proval letter nor any other provision of federal law prohibit[ed] 
abortion providers from using” RU-486 off-label.143 However, in 
determining how to construe the plain language of the statute, 
the state’s highest court held that the law effectively requires 
physicians to administer RU-486 in compliance with dosage in-
dications and treatment protocols found in both the FDA ap-
proval letter and all labeling materials.144 Though the dissent-
ing opinion in this case argues that federal law does not 
specifically limit the use of RU-486 outside of the forty-nine-
day gestational limit due to the fact that FDA cannot regulate 
the practice of medicine, the statute survived constitutional 
challenge as the plain language of R.C. 2919.123 was found to 
impose this limit—effectively regulating the practice of medi-
cine in Ohio.145 
Therefore, while FDA-approved indications cannot be con-
strued to limit medical judgment, states have the authority to 
regulate the practice of medicine and may enact legislation 
                                                          
 139. Mifepristone, also known as RU-486, is indicated for use in the termi-
nation of pregnancy through 49 days of gestation—commonly referred to as a 
medical abortion—and has no other FDA-approved indication for use during 
pregnancy. Cordray v. Planned Parenthood Cincinnati Region, 911 N.E.2d 
871, 874 (2009). 
 140. Id. at 873. 
 141. Id. at 875 (citing OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.123(F)(1) (LexisNexis 
2010)). 
 142. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.123(F)(1) (LexisNexis 2010). 
 143. Cordray, 911 N.E.2d at 876. 
 144. Id. at 877–78. 
 145. See id. at 879, 881. 
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forcing compliance with such indications.146 Further, though 
Planned Parenthood challenged the constitutionality of the 
Ohio statute on grounds that it unduly burdens patients’ rights 
to an abortion, legislation of this type need not be so restric-
tive.147 Off-label restrictions can, in fact, accommodate orphan 
conditions and other disease states while simultaneously ena-
bling states to curtail harmful misuse of regulated products. 
State-based controls on off-label use may serve as a more ap-
propriate way to curb undesirable activity—removing manufac-
turers from the equation altogether.148 
2. The Practicality of Trading FDA Oversight for State-based 
Controls 
Though this model is not without its flaws, the nature of 
the state legislative process is able to mitigate some of the is-
sues it presents. Patient advocacy groups—as well as other 
special interest groups—may lobby for exceptions. State legis-
lation can be “narrowly tailored” to address specific off-label ac-
tivity that may be of particular concern, such as the controver-
sial use of Avastin.149 Additionally, as with the Ohio law, state 
legislation regulating off-label use via the practice of medicine 
may be less susceptible to constitutional challenges—
particularly where statutory language is express.150 
Balancing concerns of patient care and physician autonomy 
with the broader goal of safeguarding public health may, how-
                                                          
 146. See Beck, supra note 13, at 76–77; Buckman Co. v. Plaintiff’s Legal 
Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 350 (stating that off-label use “is an accepted and neces-
sary corollary of the FDA’s mission to regulate in this area without directly 
interfering with the practice of medicine”). 
 147. Cordray, 911 N.E.2d at 875–76. 
 148. See Todd, supra note 80, at 429 (commenting that a lack of federal 
regulatory power leaves ample room for state involvement, particularly where 
a strong state interest, such as public safety, is at stake). 
 149. Avastin, or bevacizumab, was developed by Genentech Pharmaceuti-
cals, Inc. for the treatment of certain types of cancers. The drug is also cur-
rently used off-label to treat a form of macular degeneration. In late 2011 FDA 
Commissioner Margaret Hamburg announced that the Agency would with-
draw approval of Avastin to treat metastatic breast cancer due to high risk of 
death from stroke, heart attack, or serious bleeding. The product remains on 
the market for the treatment of other cancers such as kidney, lung, and colon 
cancer. While the decision was incredibly controversial, the withdrawal of an 
indication does not prevent oncologists from using the drug to treat breast 
cancer patients. See Shari Roan, Avastin Loses Approval as Breast Cancer 
Drug (Nov. 18, 2011) L. A. TIMES, Nov. 18, 2011, at A9. 
 150. See generally Cordray, 911 N.E.2d at 877 (asserting that the legisla-
tive intent in enacting the statute at issue was clear and unambiguous). 
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ever, prove difficult with this model. Legislation of this type 
would require multi-state cooperation to ensure successful cur-
tailing of off-label activity. Otherwise, residents could simply 
travel to states with fewer or more favorable off-label re-
strictions, defeating the intended efficacy of state-based con-
trols. The most likely hurdles to adopting such state-based con-
trols are consistency and contiguity. State legislatures will 
undoubtedly respond to intra-state pressures that may or may 
not coincide with the goals and interests of other—even neigh-
boring—states. Michigan, for example, has no compelling rea-
son to impose a similar ban on mifepristone as exists in Ohio, 
and so on. 
Though widespread implementation of state-based controls 
will certainly prove difficult initially, state legislation of this 
type may be the only reliable way to curtail off-label activity in 
the wake of constitutional challenges to FDA’s authority to do 
so. Waning federal regulatory power with respect to off-label 
promotion can only be compensated at the state level unless 
Congress elects to amend the existing regulatory scheme.151 
Moreover, the commonly proposed alternative of reimburse-
ment is, by itself, insufficient to effectively regulate off-label 
use.152 
CONCLUSION 
With pending constitutional challenges to FDA regulatory 
authority, the existing ban on off-label promotion may soon lose 
its ability to accomplish Agency goals. Yet, as one scholar notes: 
Invalidating the prohibition on off-label promotion would not affect 
the FDA’s requirement that a drug be approved by the agency before 
it can be sold in interstate commerce. Once a drug was approved as 
safe and effective for one use, however, its manufacturer would be 
free to promote it for any other use. Regulators and prosecutors would 
be limited to policing manufacturer speech after-the-fact on a case-by-
case basis. This is problematic because it would be ineffective . . . . 
Given medicine’s high stakes, it is neither surprising nor unconstitu-
tional that that the prophylacticrule that governs drug claims sup-
                                                          
 151. See Dresser supra note 30, at 476 (2009) (arguing that members of 
Congress should recognize a more affirmative role for government oversight in 
deterring inappropriate off-label prescribing). 
 152. Todd, supra note 80, at 442–43 (“The medical community must im-
prove the quality and dissemination of information relied upon in order for 
payors to make informed evidence-based reimbursement decisions, and for the 
payor-centric enforcement model to be effective.”). 
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presses some truthful speech.153 
In the event that Sorrell is interpreted to diminish authori-
ty in this realm, it seems unlikely that Congress will amend the 
existing statutory scheme to widen the scope of FDA’s regulato-
ry power.154 As such, state laws pertaining to off-label prescrib-
ing and reimbursement are alternate regulatory pathways that 
should be explored in the interest of public health. 
While state-based controls may be impractical to imple-
ment on a sufficiently-large scale to impact off-label activity, 
few options remain to impose the sort of categorical ban that 
FDA ostensibly deems necessary to protect consumers. Still, in 
the wake of cases like Sorrell and Caronia, additional regulato-
ry alternatives become imperative. Manufacturers are sure to 
pursue constitutional challenges to FDA’s restriction of off-label 
promotion, driven largely by the potential profit margin—a 
regulatory approach that wholly eliminates manufacturers is 
desirable. Unless congressional action is taken, this is not pos-
sible at the federal level. For the time being, then, state-based 
controls may serve as an option to resolve current regulatory 
uncertainties. 
                                                          
 153. Kate Greenwood, The Ban on “Off-Label” Pharmaceutical Promotion: 
Constitutionally Permissible Prophylaxis Against False or Misleading Com-
mercial Speech?, 37 AM. J. L. & MED. 278, 297–98 (2011) (citations omitted). 
 154. See Conko, supra note 86, at 184–85 (“In an extreme alternative pro-
posal, Congress could merely forbid doctors from using drugs and devices for 
off-label indications . . . [d]oing so would necessarily ‘inject[] Congress and the 
federal government directly into the practice of medicine,’ an area historically 
outside the reach of FDA’s authority.”) (alteration in original) (citations omit-
ted). 
